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Maintenance

**WEAPONS STORAGE AND SECURITY
SYSTEM PROCEDURES**

COMPLIANCE WITH THIS PUBLICATION IS MANDATORY

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This instruction implements Air Force Policy Directive 21-2, *Nonnuclear and Nuclear Munitions* and USAFE Instruction 33-201, *WS3 Equipment and Associated Classified Communications Security Items*. It applies to all personnel assigned, attached or deployed to the 31st Fighter Wing performing duties associated with the Weapon Storage and Security System (WS3) or occupying protective aircraft shelters (PAS) that contain WS3s. This instruction establishes responsibilities and procedures for conducting an actual or test Stockpile Emergency Verification (SEV). Commanders at all levels are responsible for ensuring their personnel are thoroughly knowledgeable of operating instructions and publications pertaining to WS3 operations. All units are responsible for reporting WS3 discrepancies according to Air Force Instruction (AFI) 91-204, *Investigating and Reporting US Air Force Mishaps*. Maintain and dispose of records created as a result of prescribed processes in accordance with Air Force Manual (AFMAN) 37-139, *Records Disposition Schedule* (will become AFMAN 33-322, Volume 4).

SUMMARY OF REVISIONS

This revision deletes Para **1.3.5**, referencing Para 1.15.1 through 1.15.10 that does not exist; upgraded vault schedule classification from Unclassified Nuclear Information to NATO Confidential; added SFS, OSS and 555th FS for coordination of WSV access; corrected classification of USEUCOM directive 60-12 from S-FRD to NATO Confidential; added gas generators not requiring containers to be opened for serial number verification; added munitions flight will provide Security Forces with a list of PAS prohibited items; added entry controller monitors will ensure two-person teams are separated during authentication. A (I) bar indicates revisions from the previous edition.

1. Responsibilities:

1.1. The 31st Fighter Wing (FW) Commander will:

1.1.1. Exercise overall responsibility for the use, operation, and maintenance of the WS3 system.

1.1.2. Direct the use of the Universal Release Codes (URCs) during implementation of higher levels of readiness and contingencies when deemed necessary.

1.2. The 31 FW Command Post will:

1.2.1. Authenticate Emergency Action Messages (EAMs) directing implementation of higher levels of readiness and contingencies which may result in the use of URCs.

1.2.2. Coordinate the use of the URCs with the 31 FW/CC and 31 MXS Munitions Flight. Ensure personnel signing out keys to PASs containing classified trainers contact 31MXS/MXMWNW for escort.

1.3. The 31st Maintenance Group (MXG) Commander will:

1.3.1. Exercise overall responsibility for the upkeep and maintenance of the physical portions of the WS3 system.

1.3.2. Exercise overall responsibility for the upkeep of the PASs and all real property and generators housed within PASs.

1.3.3. Establish procedures to ensure Tower Loop and Zulu Loop PAS generator fuel tanks are refilled after generators have been run.

1.3.4. Appoint in writing a building custodian for the PASs and furnish a copy to the 31 CES/CEOC.

1.3.5. Ensure compliance with the requirements in USEUCOM Directive 60-12, Section 5 (NC), and USAFEI 33-201.

1.3.6. Be the point of contact for all WS3 visits by any agency on or off Aviano AB.

1.4. The 31st Maintenance Squadron (MXS) Commander will:

1.4.1. Exercise overall responsibility for the physical portions of the WSV, associated hardware, and equipment.

1.4.2. Designate in writing the WS3 Access Approving and Authority List (AA&AL). This listing will identify all individuals who are authorized to pre-announce personnel into a WSV and all individuals who are authorized to access and/or lock/unlock a WSV.

1.4.3. Provide original copy of the AA&AL to 31st Security Forces Squadron (SFS)/SOW for authentication.

1.4.4. Ensure WS3 access requests scheduled by the 31MXS Munitions Flight are briefed to the wing monthly. WSV locations and opening dates will not be entered into scheduling slides. All written schedules will be marked "NATO Confidential".

1.5. The 31 MXS Aerospace Ground Equipment Flight will:

1.5.1. Ensure two lite-alls, three portable generators and one electric blower are serviceable at all times. This equipment will be readily available for the Weapons Maintenance Element's immediate use.

1.6. The 31 MXS Munitions Flight will:

1.6.1. Identify sufficient personnel to meet mission requirements for lock/unlock teams in writing. Each team will be comprised of two personnel, an authorized "A" and a "B" person.

1.6.2. Maintain a weapons movement capability to allow Protective Aircraft Shelter (PAS) to PAS transfer and logistics movements (in accordance with AFI 21-204, *Nuclear Weapons Procedures*, Technical Order (TO) 11N-45-51A, *Transportation of Nuclear Weapons Material, General Shipping and Limited-Life Component Data*, TO 11N-45-51C, *Transportation of Nuclear Weapons Material (Supplement)*, *Military Criteria For Shipment*, and TO 11N-B1004-1, *Weapons Loading and Tie-Down Procedures*).

1.6.3. Maintain the capability to perform storage and handling operations as outlined in AFI 21-204.

1.6.4. Maintain the capability to perform WSV periodic maintenance and inspection.

1.6.5. Ensure personnel respond within one hour after notification of alarm situations.

1.6.6. Ensure one copy of the authenticated AA&AL is forwarded to 31 MXS/MXMWNW and one to 31 MXS/MXMWSC.

1.6.7. Ensure accountable records are updated with current locations and status.

1.6.8. Coordinate all access to WSVs with SFS, OSS, and 555th FS.

1.6.9. Utilize the following codes when identifying agencies of the status of the loaded WSV and resources:

1.6.9.1. ALPHA: WSV in the locked position

1.6.9.2. BRAVO: WSV in the unlocked position (either up or down).

1.6.9.3. CHARLIE: Resources in WMT

1.6.10. For scheduled openings, provide 31st Operations Support Squadron(OSS)/PS&D and 31 SFS/SFOW a minimum 30-day notification of loaded WSVs that need to be accessed. This will be accomplished the month before the scheduled maintenance operations. Schedules for opening of WSVs containing protection level 1 assets will be marked "NATO Confidential".

1.6.11. Ensure all loaded WSV openings are coordinated again seven days prior to scheduled opening with the unit occupying the PAS.

1.6.11.1. Provide Security Forces with a list of prohibited items that may not be brought into a PAS during operations. The list will be updated as needed.

1.6.12. Ensure the Vault Maintenance Crew Chief gives a safety/contingency briefing to all personnel involved in the operation prior to the start of any WS3 opening.

1.6.13. Start Zulu and Tower Loop PAS generators during any power outage which affects the PASs.

1.6.14. Notify the MOC every time a PAS generator is started so that the MOC can notify the facility manager to fuel the generator.

1.6.15. Request and document generator training from 31 CES once a year in accordance with Aviano Instruction 32-1003, *Operation and Load Testing of Real Property Emergency Power Units*.

1.6.16. Ensure ADVON teams are provided training on procedures for WS3 operations (i.e. alarm notification and purpose of clear zones).

1.7. The 31st Civil Engineer Squadron (CES) Commander will:

- 1.7.1. Exercise overall responsibility for the electrical lines/circuits, the Lightning Protection System (LPS), facility grounding and bonding.
- 1.7.2. Ensure clear zones (15 foot and 3 foot lines) are painted and maintained in all PASs that contain WSVs (see [Attachment 2](#) and [Attachment 3](#)).
- 1.7.3. Ensure the proper general maintenance and upkeep of PASs containing WSVs.

1.8. The 31 CES Operations Flight will:

- 1.8.1. Ensure exterior maintenance on the electrical power panels, up to the electrical support panel, are maintained for PASs with WS3 and Communication Interface Assembly (CIA) for PASs without WSV.
- 1.8.2. Ensure the LPS meets all regulatory requirements.
- 1.8.3. Document all LPS and bonding system checks and provide a copy of the inspection results to 31 MXS/MXMWSC and 31 FW SEW.
- 1.8.4. Ensure maintenance personnel respond within one hour of notification for a “standby call” or “Emergency” involving any WS3 related resource.
- 1.8.5. Maintain all PAS generators in accordance with AFI 32-1062, *Electrical Power Plants and Generators*, AFI 32-1063, *Electrical Power Systems*, and Aviano Instruction 32-1003, *Operation and Load Testing of Real Property Emergency Power Units*.
- 1.8.6. Provide generator training to 31 MXS Munitions Flight and 31 SFS upon request in accordance with Aviano Instruction 32-1003, *Operation and Load Testing of Real Property Emergency Power Units*.

1.9. The 31st Communications Squadron (CS) Cable Maintenance will maintain, troubleshoot, and repair communications cable between the PAS, Local Monitoring Facility (LMF) and the Remote Monitoring Facility (RMF).

1.10. The 31 CS/SCMGB will:

- 1.10.1. Maintain, troubleshoot, and repair the console and monitor--indicator groups of the AN/FSQ-143 Weapons Storage and Security System.
- 1.10.2. Ensure personnel respond to PAS/WSV alarm situations as outlined in Aviano Instruction 21-108, *Equipment Restoration Priorities*.
- 1.10.3. Ensure all scheduled maintenance or inspections of PAS/WSV are coordinated seven days prior to scheduled date with the unit occupying/supporting the PAS.
- 1.10.4. Ensure all WS3 lines are shielded or in metal conduit and are surge protected.

1.11. The 31 SFS Commander will:

- 1.11.1. Exercise overall responsibility for the security of the WS3 System.
- 1.11.2. Provide security as needed for WS3 entry and physical verification.
- 1.11.3. Provide storage and access to URCs located in building 1280 in accordance with USAFE Instruction 33-201 and USEUCOM Directive 60-12 (N-Confidential).

- 1.11.4. Ensure all AA&ALs are authenticated.
- 1.11.5. Ensure camera views are not obstructed. If there is a deficiency, the Local Monitoring Facility Operator (LMFO) will immediately notify MOC for corrective action.
- 1.11.6. Notify MOC, Wing Operations Center and Munitions Control upon alarm notifications that will not reset.
- 1.11.7. Request and document generator training from 31 CES once a year in accordance with Aviano Instruction 32-1003, *Operation and Load Testing of Real Property Emergency Power Units*.
- 1.12. The 31st Operations Group (OG) Commander will:
 - 1.12.1. Ensure no Simulated Flame-out (SFOs) exercises are performed during vault operations.
 - 1.12.2. Ensure no tactical initial approaches are performed during vault operations.
- 1.13. The 31 FW/Maintenance Operations Center (MOC) will:
 - 1.13.1. Upon notification from the Local Monitoring Facility (LMF) of a WS3 alarm, notify Munitions Control or 31 CES/Customer Service, as applicable.
- 1.14. All units occupying PASs containing WSVs will:
 - 1.14.1. Maintain all clear zones around WS3 System (see [Attachment 2](#) and [Attachment 3](#)).
 - 1.14.2. Ensure no metal objects or masses are within 12 inches of a bonded object or mass of the PAS or WSV.
 - 1.14.3. Ensure no explosives are stored within 15 feet or K19 (whichever is greater) of the WSV system. The 15 foot requirement is identified by the solid red line. This applies to an aircraft loaded with munitions and fueled support equipment. (see [Attachment 2](#) and [Attachment 3](#))
 - 1.14.4. Exercise responsibility for the upkeep of the PAS. Ensure no equipment, furniture, or any other item that would obstruct the view of the 31 SFS/LMFOs camera view is located within the solid yellow painted line. Additionally, this includes items outside the yellow line that obstruct the LMFO view.
 - 1.14.5. Correct clear zone violations in a expedient manner.
 - 1.14.6. Ensure aircraft, equipment, and AGE not necessary to the operation (as determined by the WSV crew chief) are removed from PAS and the pad prior to the scheduled WS3 opening. (see [Attachment 3](#))
 - 1.14.7. In accordance with AFI 91-101, *Air Force Nuclear Weapons Surety Program*, provide a 24-hour point of contact to reposition or evacuate aircraft, munitions, etc. from a PAS when required.
 - 1.14.8. Ensure aircraft parked near the entrance of a PAS do not prevent the Weapons Maintenance Truck (WMT) or emergency response vehicles, i.e., fire truck, ambulance, from entering the PAS when weapons/WS3 maintenance is scheduled.
 - 1.14.9. Ensure 31 MXS/MXMW is notified of ADVON teams arriving to schedule training on WS3 operations, i.e., alarm notification and purpose of clear zones.

2. Stockpile Emergency Verification (SEV) Procedures:

2.1. The 31 FW Command Post Emergency Action (EA) personnel will:

- 2.1.1. Use a checklist that includes, as a minimum, items in Attachment 4.
- 2.1.2. Note the time SEV Phase I notification is received.
- 2.1.3. Call Munitions Control and tell them to initiate SEV procedures. Note the name of the Munitions Controller and time notification passed.
- 2.1.4. Notify Operations Group/CC that SEV procedures are in effect.
- 2.1.5. Maintain a log of significant events that apply to the SEV.
- 2.1.6. Call Munitions Control when SEV is terminated.

2.2. The 31 MXS Munitions Control will:

- 2.2.1. Use a check sheet that includes, as a minimum, items in Attachment 5.
- 2.2.2. Call the MASO and the NOCM Monitor and tell them to implement SEV procedures. Note names and times the MASO and NOCM monitor were called.
- 2.2.3. Call Weapons Maintenance Section and the Security Forces/CSC, and tell them that SEV procedures are in effect.
 - 2.2.3.1. Note the names and the times they were called.
 - 2.2.3.2. Ensure that the Weapons Maintenance Section has enough personnel on-hand to open structures for verification.
- 2.2.4. Tell the MASO when to pick up the Weapons Custody Listing.
- 2.2.5. Tell the MASO, NOCM monitor and the Weapons Maintenance Section when the SEV is terminated.

2.3. The 31 CS Base Communications Center (BCC) will:

- 2.3.1. Use locally-developed operating procedures that include, as a minimum, the items in Attachment 6.
- 2.3.2. Notify the Command Post and 31MXS/MXMWSC by telephone of all SEV messages (FLASH PRECEDENCE) immediately.
- 2.3.3. Call Munitions Control when the SEV message, WCL or termination message is received and hold it until a munitions representative arrives to pick it up.
- 2.3.4. Note the time the Weapons Custody Listing is received and Munitions Control is notified.

2.4. The 31 MXS NOCM Section will:

- 2.4.1. Use a check sheet that includes, as a minimum, items in Attachment 7.
- 2.4.2. Pick-up SEV message from the BCC, verify SEV parameters (reporting locations and items to be reported), and follow the procedures applicable to an actual SEV. Submit a negative response when parameters do not apply to the FK5682 account.
 - 2.4.2.1. Complete paragraphs 2.4.3.-2.4.6.5 for a physical verification. If only a records check is required, complete paragraphs 2.4.6.3-2.4.6.5 using munitions serial numbers from account-

able records for comparison.

2.4.3. Complete Phase I and compare with accountable records.

2.4.4. Submit a Phase I voice completion report to HQ USAFE/LGWN.

2.4.5. Call Munitions Control and tell them what time Phase I was completed.

2.4.6. Pick-up the WCL at the Telecommunications Center upon notification.

2.4.7. Complete Phase II:

2.4.7.1. The serial number of each munition will be verified using etchings, stamps, or another permanent marking.

2.4.7.2. With the exception of LLCs in H1616 cans and gas generators, outer containers of stored components will be opened to verify serial numbers.

2.4.7.3. Compare serial numbers against the Weapons Custody Listing.

2.4.7.4. Submit a Phase II voice completion report to HQ USAFE/LGWN.

2.4.7.5. Submit appropriate Phase II SEV Report, outlined in CJCSM 3150.04, *Nuclear Weapons Reports*, (S-FRD)

2.4.7.6. Tell Munitions Control when Phase II is completed.

3. SEV Test Procedures. Perform all actions for an actual SEV as outlined in paragraph 2. of this instruction.

4. Code Transfer Group (CTG) Control and Handling Procedures:

4.1. Coded/Keyed Material Management:

4.1.1. The 31 MXS Munitions Flight will have overall responsibility for managing coded/keyed materials according to USAFEI 33-201. Refer to this instruction for handling and control procedures.

4.1.2. The 31 MXS Commander or higher will:

4.1.2.1. Ensure that if the effective URC is issued during a higher state of alert, and a subsequent peacetime posture is redeclared, initiate a base-wide recode, using the reserve edition. All efforts will be made to complete this task within 24 hours from the time the peacetime posture is declared.

4.1.2.2. If the effective URC is compromised, initiate a base-wide recode, using the reserve edition immediately.

4.2. Transport. At no time will module sets be carried off base or to public areas such as dining facilities, base exchange, finance centers, MPF, etc. Carry modules in their storage containers or in locally fabricated belt pouches.

4.3. Handling/Reporting Requirements. Modules may be damaged if dropped or otherwise mishandled. Remove questionable modules from service and report discrepancies accordingly. Additionally, a complete inspection of all remaining modules will be accomplished.

4.4. Damage Reporting. Anyone detecting damage to or malfunctions of modules or WS3 Shelter Control Panels, regardless of cause, will notify 31 MXS/MXWMSC, Munitions Control.

5. Weapons Storage Vault Opening Procedures:

5.1. WS3 Opening and Closing. WS3 openings will be kept to the absolute minimum consistent with mission objectives. Openings will be scheduled, coordinated and conducted in accordance with HQ USAFE/LGWN guidance.

5.2. WS3 opening:

5.2.1. The following procedures will apply any time the WS3s are required to be opened:

5.2.2. No more than three WSVs may be unlocked simultaneously.

5.2.3. The unlocked WS3s must be close enough to each other to facilitate a 5-minute response by security response forces.

5.3. Preannouncement. The AA&AL for WSVs and local authentication matrix procedures are used by the LMFO/RMFO to verify preannouncements to the WSVs in accordance with Aviano Instruction 31-101, *Normal Security Operations* and SF Operating Instruction 31-101, *Security Operations*. Pen-and-ink deletions are the only changes that can be made to this listing.

5.4. Munitions Preannouncement authority will:

5.4.1. Contact the 31 SFS LMFO and provide the following information:

5.4.1.1. Name of the two persons opening/accessing the WS3

5.4.1.2. Location of the WS3 to be opened/accessed

5.4.1.3. Estimated time of the WS3 opening

5.4.1.4. Estimated length of time the WS3 will remain opened/accessed

5.5. The 31 SFS MFOs in turn will:

5.5.1. Verify that the individual making the WS3 opening notification is authorized by reviewing the AA&AL.

5.5.2. Verify the two-person team is authorized to access WSVs according to AA&AL.

5.5.3. Verify with the response force leader that the response force is assembled and in place and the surveillance guard and the detection screen is posted.

5.5.4. Verify the individuals are on the AA&AL and challenge the unlock team utilizing the WSV matrix.

5.5.5. If the challenge is answered correctly, the LMFO will instruct the Security Force that the unlock team has permission to access the WSV.

5.5.6. If the matrix challenge is unsuccessful, entry will be denied and individual will be placed at a disadvantage. The LMFO will instruct the Security Force that the unlock team has miss authenticated and is not granted entry into the WSV.

5.5.7. The LMFO will contact 31MXS, Munitions Control, advise them of the situation, and request an additional unlock team to take possession of the unlock modules.

5.5.8. Unlock modules will be transferred to a new unlock/lock team once they arrive on the scene.

5.6. The 31 SFS entry controller will:

5.6.1. Ensure all equipment, hand carried items, and vehicles entering/leaving the exclusion area are searched and approved by the Sole Vouching Authority (SVA).

5.6.2. The EC monitors the two-person team ensuring they remain separated by a *minimum of 10 feet during opening/closing authentication and verifies with *LMFO/RMFO that the authentication was all in order.

5.7. The Sole Vouching Authority (SVA) will:

5.7.1. Contact the Security Forces when he/she is ready to initiate the PAS purge.

5.7.2. The PAS will be purged and the exclusion area will be established by the SVA and Security Forces before unlocking a WSV (Attachment 8).

5.8. The 31 MXS two-person unlock team will:

5.8.1. Identify themselves to the Security Force entry controller at the PAS. After the purge is complete (if not already accomplished), the security force will contact the LMFO/RMFO. Refer to Aviano Instruction 31-101 and SF Operating Instruction 31-101 for PAS access.

6. Preventive Maintenance and Inspection Requirements:

6.1. WS3 opening will be kept to the absolute minimum. Periodic WS3 maintenance and munitions maintenance/inspection actions should be accomplished simultaneously if possible.

6.2. The 31 MXS/MXMWMN will provide the MOC, WCP, SFS, Munitions Control, 31 OSS and 555 FS a monthly forecast of scheduled WSV maintenance and inspection requirements. The forecast will be done the month prior to required maintenance operations. All schedules will be marked "NATO Confidential".

6.3. WSVs should be scheduled so approximately the same amounts of WSVs are opened each month. Additional openings will be required to troubleshoot and/or correct WSV malfunctions, to support logistics moves, and to support MASO actions.

6.4. WSV openings will be monitored by 31 MXS Munitions Flight Commander/Chief to ensure unlock codes are not exhausted prior to them being superseded.

6.5. If during any WSV opening or closing a malfunction occurs, CSC will notify 31 MXS MXWMSC, Munitions Control. CSC will ensure security remains posted until the malfunction can be cleared. Munitions Control will recall additional WSV maintenance technicians to troubleshoot and repair the WSV if required.

6.6. The attachments in this instruction may be used separately.

R. MICHAEL WORDEN, Brig Gen, USAF
Commander

Attachment 1**GLOSSARY OF REFERENCES AND SUPPORTING INFORMATION*****References***

Air Force Instruction (AFI) 21-204, *Nuclear Weapons Procedures*
AFI 21-204, *Nuclear Weapons Procedures*, USAFE Supplement 1
AFI 31-101, Vol 2, *The Air Force Nuclear Security Program Standards* (UNCL) (FOUO) Air Force Manual (AFMAN) 37-139, *Records Disposition Schedule* (will become AFMAN 33-322, Volume 4)
AFI 91-101, *The Air Force Nuclear Weapons Surety Program*
AFI 91-112, *Safety Rules US Strike Aircraft*
USEUCOM Directive 60-12, *Nuclear Surety Management for the WS3*
Aviano Instruction 31-101, *Normal Security Operations*
SF Operating Instruction 31-101, *Security Operations*
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Manual (CJCSM) 3150.04, *Nuclear Weapons Reports*
TO 11N-BXX-1, (*Classified Title*)

Abbreviations and Acronyms

AA&AL—Access Approving & Authority List
ADVON—Advance Operations
CIA—Communications Interface Assembly
CSC—Central Security Control
EAL—Entry Access List
LMF—Local Monitoring Facility
LMFO—Local Monitoring Facility Operator
LPS—Lightning Protection System
MASO—Munitions Accountable Systems Officer
MFO—Monitoring Facility Operator
MOC—Maintenance Operations Center
NOCM—Nuclear Ordnance Commodity Management
PAS—Protective Aircraft Shelter
PDP—Power Distribution Panel
POV—Privately Owned Vehicle
RMF—Remote Monitoring Facility
RMFO—Remote Monitoring Facility Operator

SCP—Shelter Control Panel

SEV—Stockpile Emergency Verification

SVA—Sole Vouching Authority

URC—Universal Release Code

WCL—Weapons Custody Listing

WS3—Weapon Storage and Security System

WSV—Weapons Storage Vault

Terms

Access Approving and Authority List—A listing, signed by the squadron commander, identifying individuals by name, rank, Social Security number (SSN). This listing is used by organizations who access or unlock WSVs. This listing contains codes identifying the individuals particular function in the access/unlock process.

Entry Authority List—A listing, signed by the squadron commander, identifying individuals by name, rank and SSN. This listing is authenticated by 31 SFS/SFOW and is used to allow any individual listed access into an exclusion area, if the SVA approves the individuals need to enter.

MASO—Accountable officer in charge of Air Force Munitions Account (AFK), conventional and NOCM Section, appointed by the wing commander, in accordance with AFI 23-111, *Management of Government Property in Possession of the Air Force*..

NOCM—Nuclear Ordnance Commodity Material in accordance with AFI 21-204.

Phase—I—A physical count of all weapons included in the SEV scope compared with unit accountability records. Disassembling or opening containers is not required.

Phase II—A comparison of weapon serial numbers with accountability records and with Weapons Custody Listings provided by Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA). Some disassembly or decanning of weapons may be required to gain access to serial numbers. Etched or stamped serial numbers are permanent markings and will be used when performing verifications.

Physical Verification—Requires units to perform Phase I and Phase II actions and reports.

Purge—Verification of PAS security before introduction of weapons. All objects attached to a PAS, within 12 inches of PAS wall, or within 12 inches of a bonded object, will be bonded. All aircraft, vehicles, equipment or objects must be verifiable as secure as determined by security police and WSV crew chief. All aircraft, vehicles, equipment or objects found to be unsecured, not properly bonded, or unnecessary to the WSV operation will be removed from the PAS. Clear zone requirements, specified in [Attachment 2](#) and [Attachment 4](#), will be enforced. All aircraft, conventional munitions, vehicles and equipment will be removed as outline in [Attachment 3](#).

Records Check Verification—Only consists of a comparison of weapon serial numbers from accountable records against WCLs provided by FCDTRA. No Phase I actions or reports are required. Only Phase II reporting is required. No physical verification actions are required.

Scheduled Opening—An opening that the 31 MXS is able to schedule 30 days or more in advance, i.e. periodic inspections of vault or weapon systems, semiannual inventories (April/ October), and most

logistic movements). Scheduled openings will be coordinated in accordance with HQ USAFE/LGWN guidance.


Sole Vouching Authority (SVA)—An individual authorized by their squadron commander who has the sole authority to allow personnel entry into and departure from exclusion areas.

Unscheduled Opening—An opening that the 31 MXS can not schedule 30 days or more in advance, i.e. alarm response, emergency verifications, contingencies, short notice logistic movements, and vaults suspected of discrepancies (water, fuel, etc.). Unscheduled openings will be coordinated in accordance with HQ USAFE/LGWN guidance.

Weapons Custody List (WCL)—A serialized list of components and weapons transmitted by FCDTRA to the Nuclear Ordnance Commodity Management (NOCM) Section Account (FK5682) for verification.

Attachment 2

WSV/HASIIDS CLEAR ZONES ELECTRICAL SUPPORT PANELS




NOTE

Maintain clear zones of at least 12 inches around all metal masses that are bonded

Attachment 3

WSV CLEAR ZONES

**NOTE**

Requirements in ED 60-12 states that the following must be visible from the overhead camera: "The scene includes all shelter vault panels (shelter control, power distribution, etc.) and 10 inches above." and for the vault the "scene includes all of the vault cover, including three feet around the cover and the floor box."